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NOSTALGIA, MONUMENTALITY 
AND THE GREAT WESTERN RAIL-
WAY
Henry Atmore　
“Do all engine drivers, I wonder, eternally wish they 
were small boys?”１ 
Nostalgia has some odd settings and unlikely objects.  The first 
builders and users of steam locomotives would have been perplexed by 
the nostalgic significance later invested in their creations.  Nostalgia 
means to return to a place at once familiar, sustaining and magical; 
railways made it impossible ever to go home again, to be untroubled by 
machines, timetables, the pressures of the working day.2 So it is curious 
that they now occasion reverie, evoking a past nobler than the present.
The following is an excerpt from the introduction to a collection of 
photographs taken by Arthur Mace, an English clergyman, in a thirty-
year period spanning the Second World War.3 It is representative of a 
frame of mind less often to be met with, as the number of people who 
can remember steam locomotion as anything other than a device to in-
ject period gloom into costume dramas dwindles – representative of a 
world itself vanished or vanishing, the world of O.S.Nock, ‘Station Saun-
tering’, the Ian Allen Locospotters Club.4 The text is naïve, but the sym-
１　Flann O’Brian, The Best of Myles, (London, 1993), 39.
２　William Greg, ‘Life at High Pressure’, Contemporary Review, 25 (1874/5), 623-638. 
３　C.Garratt, The Golden Age of Steam Railways, (London, 1994).
４　O.S.Nock, One Facet of an Autobiography, (Durham, 1992); Roger Lloyd, The Fascination
of Railways, (London, 1951), 91-117; Ian Allen, Driven by Steam, (Shepperton, 1992); Michael 
G. Harvey, Diary of a Train-spotter, 1955-59, (Peterborough, 1993). All of these books,
and countless others like them, contain passages cognate to the one under discussion here.
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pathies it displays are not wholly alien to more sober excursions into the 
history of steam technology.5
Colin Garratt, the author, establishes his nostalgic credentials by 
denying that he is being nostalgic.  “Arthur Mace’s work comes from a 
golden age”, he writes.  “It was as fabulous as we remember it to be, 
time has not added a rosy glow”.6  He speaks out in anger, not irony:
[T]hese pictures remind us of how much our railway has lost, to the detri-
ment of society … The hideousness of our motorway network, the billions of 
pounds squandered on roads, with all their inefficiencies, point to one of the 
20th century’s most disastrous social policies.  And those policies, which fly 
in the face of all logic, continue to be perpetuated today.  If the railway is, 
as Churchill said, the agent of civilisation, then the motor car is the agent 
of self-centredness, crime and life-threatening pollution.  The road system of 
today has not evolved by being what is right for the nation, rather more it 
shows how vested interests can prevail - which tails can wag the dog.  Twen-
ty thousand locomotives which served the nation’s transport needs in a safe, 
disciplined and properly co-ordinated system have been replaced by millions 
of road vehicles which have settled on our society like a plague of flies.7 
Nostalgia of this kind fuses the personal, the political, and the aes-
thetic.  The motorway network is “hideous” and so are the values it 
propagates.  Railway carriages were arenas for social interaction: cars 
encourage disregard for other people, and of the environment as existing 
beyond one’s use of it.  Garratt, like John Tyme and other anti-motor-
way campaigners, associates roads with political tyranny, and railways 
with “democracy” – democracy defined not in terms of individual free-
５　Richard L.Hills, Power From Steam: A History of the Stationary Steam Engine, (Cam-
bridge, 1989), 1-12 (‘The noblest machine’); L.T.C.Rolt, Landscape with Machines, (London, 
1971).
６　Garratt, Golden Age, n.p.  Elsewhere, he has admitted to being a nostalgic, but not to 
nostalgia, an odd formulation.  See Colin Garratt, British Steam Nostalgia (London, 1987), 
6-7.  He is innocent of the literature telling us that it has always been the case that the 
past is golden and modern times the pits: c.f. Raymond Williams, The Country and the 
City, (London, 1973).
７　Garratt, Golden Age.
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dom, but social responsibility.8  Of course, this is all very contentious. 
Garratt is right to describe the construction of the motorway network as 
a ‘social policy’.  That it has been “disastrous” environmentally would be 
difficult to dispute.  Few also would deny its aesthetic shortcomings. 
But much, surely, has been gained as well as lost – in the way of per-
sonal autonomy, leisure opportunities, respite from urban anomie.9  Not 
every car driver is “self-centred”; not every use to which the car is put 
warrants our contempt.  Garratt would not be the first nostalgic for 
whom “what is right for the nation” serves as a screen for a deeper mis-
anthropy.10
He is not an old man, and his account of his fixation on steam loco-
motives gains poignancy from the fact that, while still young, he wit-
nessed their obsolescence.  His nostalgia both palliates and reinforces 
his predicament, the belatedness of his entry upon the scenes of his own 
life.  The estrangement he exhibits is far from unique to railway enthu-
siasts.  It might be argued that we always live our childhoods in a dif-
ferent world.  Disenchantment is always uncomfortable, and in response 
nostalgia succours as it estranges, expressing a desire to be other than 
where and when we are.  The half-actual, half-mythological, half-re-
membered, half-imagined past will often be richer, denser, surer, more 
colourful.  The past so evoked can be a challenge to the present.  It can 
also mark a refusal to engage with the present in terms that have any 
present meaning.11
８　John Tyme, Motorways versus Democracy: public inquiries into road proposals and their 
political significance, (London, 1978); D.Starkie, The Motorway Age: Traffic Policies in 
Post-war Britain, (Oxford, 1982). 
９　Peter Thorold, The Motoring Age: The Automobile in Britain, 1896-1939, (London, 2003); 
L.K.J.Setright, Drive On!: A Social History of the Moror Car, (London, 2004).  See also 
Patrick Wright, On Living in an Old Country: The National Past in Contemporary Britain, 
(London, 1985), 52-87. 
10　As was the case in one of the earliest and most remarkable outbursts of nostalgic acidie 
in English, Wordsworth’s diatribe against the Kendal & Windermere Railway (The Prose 
Works of William Wordsworth, Volume 3, (Oxford, 1974), 340-366). 
11　For the politics of nostalgia see Raphael Samuel, Theatres of Memory: Past and Present 
in Contemporary Culture, (London, 1994); Patrick Wright, A Journey Through Ruins: A 
Keyhole Portrait of British Postwar Life and Culture, (London, 1992) and The Village that 
Died for England: The Strange Story of Tyneham, (London, 1995);  David Lowenthal, ↗ 
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On this understanding, the nostalgic past defeats reason.  One of 
the pleasures of reverie is the belatedness of what occasions it; as Gas-
ton Bachelard wrote: “When we turn inwards upon ourselves we turn 
aside from truth.”12  When rendered in nostalgic form the past becomes 
difficult or impossible to assimilate to contemporary experience.13  This 
quality is a source of strength, of a kind; nostalgia is unfalsifiable.  But 
it is also a weakness.  Nostalgia does not capture the past as non-nos-
talgics think they know it to have been: different only in degree, not in 
kind, from the present.
Colin Garatt, though, must insist that the world really was differ-
ent – and better – back then.  If he is being ‘merely’ nostalgic then his 
denunciation of the motorway will have very little force.  This is where 
Arthur Mace comes in.  Through what Roland Barthes called the “mag-
ic” of photography, Mace returns to Garratt, with “an evidential force”, 
the lineaments of past reality.14  Mace’s photographs are proof that 
“time has not added a rosy glow” to his memory, and ground his distaste 
for the corruption and squalor of the present in something like historical 
fact.
After the promises of gold and disavowals of rosiness it is a little 
deflating to turn to the photographs themselves.  For one thing, they are 
all in black and white.  For another – although Garratt’s “safe, disci-
plined and properly co-ordinated” has prepared us for this – they are 
oddly inhuman.  Their contingency is palpable: what we see here is not 
a world but a way of showing a world.  Mace’s pictures depict  locomo-
tive engines, in motion, framed by craggy highlands and bruised skies, 
↘The  Past is a Foreign Country, (Cambridge, 1985); and, in particular, Stuart Tannock, 
‘Nostalgia Critique’ Cultural Studies, 9 (1995), 453-464.  For corollaries in nostalgic repre-
sentations of childhood in nineteenth and early twentieth-century poetry and fiction see 
Walter Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-1870, (Yale, 1957), 85-89 and Juliet 
Dusinberre, Alice to the Lighthouse: Children’s Books and Radical Experiments in Art, re-
vised ed., London, 1999), 123-138.
12　Gaston Bachelard, The Psychoanalysis of Fire, (1938), tr. A.C.M.Moss, (New York, 1987), 
5.
13　David Lowenthal, ‘Nostalgia tells it like it wasn’t’, in C.Shaw & M.Chase (eds.) The 
imagined past. history and nostalgia, (Manchester, 1989), 18-32.
14　Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, tr. R.Howard, (London, 1982), 88-89.
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sometimes in more sedate passage through allotments and back gar-
dens, or halted in stations.  A few capture drivers, stokers, signalmen, 
and guards going about their labours.  In none are any passengers vis-
ible.  The engines themselves come across as a mythical, elemental 
agency, built and worked by men, but only accidentally answering to 
human purposes.  In this, Mace’s aesthetic conforms to the nostalgic, 
alienated modernism extant in 1930s Britain, when he was most active, 
a modernism still in thrall to the machine, but capable of ironic reflec-
tion on the technological whimsies of the Victorians.15  The compositions 
are stiff, hieratic, gloomy, cold - the engines are monuments, things to 
be admired, or even worshipped.  It is difficult to imagine them ever 
having been quotidian, ever being used.  As is usually the case with 
railway books, the captions identify the trains very precisely, by line, 
company, and technical specifications.16  If the photographs seek to awe 
with the physical power of steam engines, the text impresses upon us 
the corporate power of the companies that ran them.
This is, it bears repeating, an odd basis for nostalgia.  Mace fet-
ishizes the engines and Garratt fetishizes Mace’s representations. Far 
from enabling his readers to “relive that amazing period of man’s indus-
trial progress”, the pictures doubly defeat Garratt’s intentions.  Their 
moral significance, the superiority of the railway as “agent of civilisa-
tion” to the motorcar as agent of all sorts of pestilential horrors, is far 
from apparent.  Even if it were, Mace’s vision is too idiosyncratic to save 
Garratt from the limits of nostalgia.  It seems, like Garratt’s rhetoric, to 
come from a different world.
Svetlana Boym has argued for a distinction between two types of 
nostalgia: reflective and restorative.17  Restorative nostalgia is nationalist 
15　The ur-text for this sensibility is Humphrey Jennings, Pandaemonium: The Coming of 
the Machine as seen by Contemporary Observers, (London, 1985).
16　To be fair to Garratt, in the collection of his own railway photography, British Steam 
Nostalgia, he works very hard to inject humanity into what is, essentially, a montage 
of rusting metal.  Engines headed for the scrap-yard in the early 1960s have a pathos 
rather lacking from the so-called ‘golden age’. 
17　Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, (New York, 2001), xviii-xix, 41-56.
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and monumental, characterised by myths of origin and identifications of 
whom is to be excluded from the earthly paradise.  It is expressed 
through statues, obelisks, memorials, flags and uniforms, national an-
thems, vengeful folk ditties, state propaganda.  Reflective nostalgia is 
altogether more playful.  It tends to be literary, and produces its share 
of unreadable poetry and prose, together with famous epiphanies on the 
smell of madeleines and the flutter of butterfly wings in the grounds of 
Russian country houses.   At its best, reflective nostalgia challenges 
monumentality, the effort to channel the mind’s drifts, to focus memory. 
Reflective nostalgia is a trust that the mundane and singular prompts of 
reverie can help us to resist the coercions inscribed into public memori-
als, our being told what it is we should remember, and the possibility 
that what we do remember belongs to us only collectively.
Boym’s distinction is attractive, but a little pat.  Where does some-
body like Colin Garratt fit into her typology?  He stresses the personal 
to the extent of photographing his girlfriend at the old Banbury Great 
Western depot and describing, without embarrassment, how they “sought 
solace” in the railway and each other.  There is a picture of him at age 
ten, with short back-and-sides, jug ears, and a hopeful expression.18  Yet 
he is, as I suggested earlier, representative - of an age, a way of think-
ing, a bundle of grievances, with a nostrum, no matter how regressive, 
ever to hand.  He is so little enamoured of the state that he accuses it 
of deliberately fostering crime, selfishness and environmental degrada-
tion.  But the vehicle of his nostalgia, and his assurance that his dis-
satisfaction is rooted in something more than nostalgia, is a collection of 
photographs that celebrates the inhuman power of the machine.
Not all railway nostalgias conform to type, and one might doubt 
whether Colin Garratt is as representative as I have made him out to 
be.  Nevertheless, for the purposes of this essay I take the following to 
be significant features of most, if not all, of them:
A. Fetishization – railways imbued with love, care, decency; the 
railway as the figure of the good life.
18　Garratt, British Steam Nostalgia, 7, 25.
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B. An affective response to monumentality.  This can be traced back 
to the picturesque (rust and ruins) or the romantic sublime (fires 
and smokes); here, my concern will be with more straightfor-
wardly Arcadian tropes of ease, leisure, simplicity, the railway 
as the figure of the good life.19 
C. An ambiguously politicized aesthetic.  Metaphors of binding, ty-
ing, sustaining, supporting suggest the railway as a monolithic 
social agency.  But the aesthetics of railway nostalgia contrast 
the variety and delight to be had in railway architecture and 
locomotive design with the alienating monotony of the road net-
work.
D. A refusal to countenance the profit motive.  Money is not men-
tioned in railway nostalgias.  ‘Commerce’, ‘commercial impera-
tives’ figure, if they figure at all, as threats to the community of 
railway users.
E. A belief that once upon a time everything worked as it should. 
The contrast, more or less implicit, is with the present, where 
nothing works.  The gamut of fecklessness ranges from station 
staff who don’t understand English, to something like the Hat-
field disaster.
F. Community without democracy.  Railway nostalgia will speak of 
the ‘public good’, the ‘public interest’, but it abhors the mass.  In 
terms of general theory of social agency, communities are valor-
ized, autonomy deprecated.  In terms of public policy, the good 
sense of Keynes is as obvious as the bad faith of Friedman. 
Hence, the complex conviction of betrayal when the state is seen 
to be furthering alienated individualism.  
G. An ambivalent relationship to the state.  On the one hand, state 
railway policy is invariably malign, destructive and irrational; 
on the other, two of the major foci of railway nostalgia are the 
period post-Combination (Garratt’s Golden Age), and the years 
19　An ironic reversal of the famous argument made in Leo Marx, Machine in Garden: 
Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America, (Oxford, 1964). 
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of British Rail pre-Dr Beeching; both times when the state’s in-
terest in railways was active and fiscally burdensome.  Thus, the 
state is at once to blame for our current plight, and the only 
hope for future relief.
H. Reason and Interest.  The nostalgic lays claim to objectivity and 
disinterest: railways are better, for everyone.  But his perspective 
is by most standards irrational, and compelling only insofar as it 
is affective.  This is another aspect of nostalgia’s unfalsifiability: 
a mode of life, rather than an argument, it need not submit to 
reason.
It goes without saying that railway nostalgia involves the misrepre-
sentation of a great deal of railway history.  What perhaps does need to 
be said is that its relation to the past it rewrites is dialectical, to the 
point of its appearing almost perverse in its choice of an object to yearn 
after.  One possible explanation of the discrepancy between railway nos-
talgia and railway history is this: that railway nostalgia has been con-
structed by and of elements antithetical to its desire.  Obviously railway 
nostalgia is a construct – what else could it be?  The question is, by 
whom, and for what purposes?
In order to suggest an answer I will be re-entering familiar territo-
ry: the early history of that most magical of railways, the Great West-
ern.  This serves as a corrective to the nostalgic imagination, by show-
ing that, for example, railways were quite as prone to the malign mach-
inations of “vested interests” as any modern motorway bypass.  Indeed, 
it might well be that “vested interests” as understood by Garratt origi-
nated in the heroic age of railway construction.20  But it is, to be honest, 
not difficult to show where nostalgics get their history wrong.  The 
greater challenge is to subject the forms of nostalgia to historical scru-
20　Philip S. Bagwell, ‘The Railway Interest: Its Organization and Influence, 1839-1914’, 
Journal of Transport History, 7 (1965), 65-86; Geoffrey Alderman, The Railway Interest, 
(Leicester, 1973); on the newly pejorative sense of the word ‘interest’ extant in early-mid 
nineteenth century Britain see A.O.Hirschman, ‘The Concept of Interest: From Euphe-
mism to Tautology’, in Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays, (New 
York, 1986), 35-55.
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tiny.  Terms like “vested interests”, “hideousness”, “logic”, “properly co-
ordinated” – which, as suggested, involve the nostalgic in much perplex-
ity, if not downright self-contradiction - do not arise from nowhere.  It 
will be my contention that the Great Western Railway represents an 
unusually rich sample of the nineteenth-century loam from which twen-
tieth-century nostalgia has drawn its ambiguous sustenance.
1. NOSTALGIA SITUATED:
GOD’S WONDERFUL RAILWAY
In Britain, where railway nostalgia is concerned, all railways are by 
no means equal.  The GWR was not destined to be the most profitable 
and was certainly never the most efficient of Victorian railway compa-
nies.  What it did possess was style.  Memories of travelling on the 
GWR were shot through with a sense of place and occasion; luxury, 
summer holidays, Paddington Station, generously spaced rails running 
to the horizon, chocolate-cream carriages, bottle-green engines setting 
speed records well into the twentieth century.  The company’s viaducts, 
bridges and tunnels still impress; museums at Didcot, Swindon and Col-
eford, together with an enormous popular literature, offer ample satis-
faction to those who want to know more.  And, if it were famous for 
nothing else, the GWR would retain some measure of immortality by 
association with its chief engineer, Isambard Kingdom Brunel.   
Brunel is at once a brilliant and problematic figure.21  Both upbring-
ing and temperament set him apart from his great engineering rivals, 
self-made northern autodidacts like Thomas Telford, John Rennie, 
George Stephenson, James Nasmyth, and Joseph Locke.  He would be 
21　The classic biography is L.T.C.Rolt, Isambard Kingdom Brunel (London, 1961); this 
can now be supplemented by Angus Buchanan, Brunel: The Life and Times of Isambard 
Kingdom Brunel, (London, 2002), which is, by the author’s own admission, drawn from 
much the same materials as Rolt’s.  It does, however, contain very useful reflections on 
Brunel’s status as a hero-engineer (210-227).  Less scholarly, but refreshingly revision-
ist is Adrian Vaughan, Isambard Kingdom Brunel: Engineering Knight-Errant, (London, 
1991), which perhaps puts a little too much stress on the errancy.   
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regarded, not always kindly, as “the very Napoleon of engineers, think-
ing more of glory than of profit”, “the Michael Angelo of modern engi-
neering.”  “His conceptions were always cast in a colossal mode” Joseph 
Devey, Locke’s biographer, was to write.22  ‘Brunel’ stands for the engi-
neer as hero, creator, visionary, moulding the material environment for 
the benefit of future generations.23
His ambition was to build the perfect railway, “the best road that 
imagination could devise.”24  He was not content to be one of “the crowd 
of engineers” slavishly “following in the track of the Stephensons”; in-
stead, he “hoped to imperishably connect his name with a new system.”25 
He would not do so alone, however, and that was the root of many of his 
later troubles.  The image of the engineer as heroic genius obscures the 
fact that the fate of his projects was never entirely, or even largely, in 
his hands.  The success of any company hinged on the acquisition and 
retention of territory.26  To this end decisions had to be made over 
routes, compensation to landowners, locomotive design, carriage design, 
width of gauge, station architecture, the relative commercial merits of 
freight and passenger traffic – only some of which came under the juris-
diction of the chief engineer, and none of which, ultimately, needed har-
monise with his interests.  The successful railway engineer was a practi-
cal man, attuned to the technical exigencies of his trade, but also to the 
concerns of managers, directors and shareholders.  In the Smilesian tra-
dition of industrial hagiography he came to resemble the machines he 
22　Samuel Smiles, ‘The Brunels’, Quarterly Review, 112 (1862), 1-39: on 38; Joseph Devey, 
The Life of Joseph Locke, (London, 1862), 189-190
23　In technology studies terms Brunel is the Pasteur of the machine world, following 
Bruno Latour’s distinction between Pasteur and ‘Pasteur’, so as not to ‘confuse the force 
of a man with that attributed to him’.  See Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, 
tr. A.Sheridan & J.Law, (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), 15.  There is a large uncritical lit-
erature on the engineer as a creative force in history.  See (e.g.) S.Dasgupta, Technology 
and Creativity, (Oxford, 1996); H.Petroski, Invention by Design. How Engineers Get from 
Thought to Thing, (Cambridge, Mass., 1996); and (better), T.L.Hankins & R.J.Silverman, 
Instruments and the Imagination, (Princeton, 1995).  
24　Rolt, Brunel, 54.
25　Samuel Sidney, Gauge Evidence: The History and Prospects of the Railway System, Il-
lustrated by the evidence given before the Gauge Commission, (London, 1846), xix.
26　Michael Freeman, Railways and the Imagination, (New Haven, 1999), 153-164.
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constructed: “orderly, regular in his habits, disciplined, predictable, me-
thodical ... even-tempered, and law abiding.  He had brought order out 
of the chaos of his natural instincts; sensuousness, self-indulgence, reck-
lessness, untidiness and emotional outbursts were foreign to him.” 
Brunel was anything but predictable; not, perhaps, quite the right kind 
of hero.27 
The GWR was formed in 1833 by an association of Bristol and Lon-
don merchants, incorporated in 1835, and opened to the public on 4 
June 1838.  Brunel, already known in Bristol for his work on the Clifton 
Bridge project, was appointed chief engineer on 6 March 1833.28  He was 
fortunate in having taken up with a group of men who, for reasons of 
their own, were willing to indulge his fertile technological imagination, 
his desire to build the best of all possible railways.  In October 1835 the 
directorate met to consider Brunel’s proposal to build their line on a 
7-foot gauge, as opposed to the 4-foot 8-inches most new companies, fol-
lowing the Liverpool & Manchester Railway, were adopting as standard. 
The wider gauge promised much higher speed and comfort, but also 
more expense.  The directors accepted the proposal by a large majority.29 
The GWR was the “Great Experimental Railway”, “an entirely new 
system” of railway organization,30 an experiment in speed.31  The seven-
foot gauge would remove shaking and enable the use of more powerful 
locomotives.  These would draw larger and heavier carriages, leading to 
greater safety and comfort for passengers.32  A brilliant young locomo-
tive engineer, Daniel Gooch, was appointed to help design the engines 
(mechanics was never Brunel’s strong suit).  Gooch, who was to enjoy a 
close but difficult relationship with the great man, recalled that he and 
27　Thomas Hughes, Selections from Lives of the Engineers by Samuel Smiles, (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1966), 11.  For a reappraisal of Brunel’s uneasy place in the Smilesian tradition 
see Andrew Jarvis, Samuel Smiles and the Construction of Victorian Values, (Sutton, 
1997), 120-121.
28　Rolt, Brunel 78-80.
30　Smiles, ‘Brunels’, 29. 
31　G.A.Nokes [‘Sekon’], A History of the Great Western Railway, (London, 1895), 4.
32　Nicholas Wood, A Practical Treatise on Railroads and Interior Communications in Gen-
eral, 3rd Ed., (London, 1838), 713-719.
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his fellows “suffered dreadfully” from Brunel’s zeal “to perfect his road.”33 
The interests of colleagues, shareholders and, some argued, passengers, 
were subordinated to the grand design.
The result was, in L.T.C.Rolt’s phrase, the “commodification of 
speed”.34  The GWR was “an enthusiastic admirer of itself ” and adver-
tised its superiority on posters and hoardings, in pamphlets and the 
pages of the railway press.35  Its services were faster, safer and more 
comfortable than those offered by narrow-gauge competitors.   It was 
presented as an agent of national regeneration.  The less time spent in 
transit, the more could be devoted to productive activity.  The swiftness 
of Gooch’s engines was “equivalent to the creation of time”, and the 
broad-gauge held up “as the sign of human advancement, and the nar-
row, by consequence, as the type of the degradation of mankind - a de-
liberate re-establishment of a lower standard for every benefit which 
railroads confer on mankind.”36 
From an early date in its history the GWR was a successful genera-
tor of images.  These reinforced the company’s grandiose self-conception. 
Most notable was a collection of lithographs, The History and Descrip-
tion of the Great Western Railway, published by David Bogue in the 
spring of 1846.  The artist and author, John Cooke Bourne, was the best 
of a small band of railway lithographers.  Eight years previously he had 
published A Series of Lithographed Drawings on the London and Bir-
mingham Railway (in four parts, 1838-9) to much acclaim.37  This ear-
lier work had been marked by an unusual attention to the details of 
railway technology and the work that went into railway construction. 
His work for the GWR evinced a similar concern with the sheer diffi-
culty of the enterprise.  “Those glistening lines of iron that now traverse 
33　Daniel Gooch, Memoirs and Diary (1867-1889), ed. R.B.Wilson, (Newton Abbot, 1972), 
29-31. 
34　L.T.C.Rolt, George and Robert Stephenson, (London, 1960), 281. 
35　For GWR advertising methods see F.Booker, The Great Western Railway: A New His-
tory, (Newton Abbot, 1977), 9-15; Nokes, History of the GWR, 113. 
36　‛The B.G. and the N.G’, Fraser’s Magazine, 33 (1846), 743-750. 
37　Francis Klingender, Art and the Industrial Revolution, (New York, 1968), 136-140. 
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England in every direction ... with the white cloud that hovers over 
them,” Bourne wrote, were “the representations of much patient labour, 
much steady perseverance, of frequent disappointments suffered, of 
heavy losses incurred, before they become the well known symbol of 
commercial activity and wealth.”38  But be that as it may, the GWR 
emerged from Bourne’s drawings as a quite different animal from the 
LBR.  In place of excavations, scaffolds, piles of earth and jumbles of 
metal parts, dray-horses and scurrying navvies, we have something 
more ambiguous.  The ruptures Brunel inflicted on landscape and work-
force are largely hidden from view.  
Instead, Bourne describes GWR employees, clad in livery of dark 
green, scarlet and gold, having the appearance of “functionaries of an 
imperial court”, anticipating every whim of the genteel traveller.39  He 
shows the restrained classicism of features such as the Wharncliffe Via-
duct and Maidenhead Bridge complementing rather than overpowering 
the countryside.  The viaduct looks Attic, with its clean lines and curv-
ing sunlit surfaces, and happy bucolic cows congregating in the fore-
ground.  The entrance of the infamous Box Hill tunnel, source of terror 
to weaker-willed passengers, gains a deceptive spaciousness.  But while 
demonstrating the GWR’s commitment to speed, safety and comfort, 
Bourne’s lithographs also record a tendency towards monumentality. 
The broad gauge engines are squat and malevolent, less iron horses, 
more giant frogs.  Workers, passengers and spectators are dwarfed by 
machines and masonry; the men squatting to the side of the tunnel in 
the frontispiece look grubby and out of place.  The net effect of the lith-
ographs is to make people seem somehow anterior to the enterprise.
A slightly earlier and even more famous image also caught the am-
biguity.  In Turner’s Rain, Steam, and Speed (1844) a GWR express 
crosses the Maidenhead Bridge during a violent rainstorm.  The picture, 
as much as any of Bourne’s lithographs, was an exercise in puffery. 
38　John Cooke Bourne, The History and Description of the Great Western Railway, (London, 
1846), 2.
39　Ibid.  On GWR livery in the period see E.T.MacDermot, History of the Great Western 
Railway, 1833-1863, (London, 1964), 357-358, and Booker, The Great Western Railway, 13. 
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GWR trains were not noted for their reliability; here the engine spits 
fire and hurtles past, a blur of speed.  The bridge, with its two delicate 
elliptical arches, was a typical Brunel extravagance, and many predicted 
that it would collapse.  In the picture it is massive and dense, with-
standing the storm, comfortably bearing the train.  Turner was a GWR 
shareholder, and Rain, Steam and Speed a fitting expression of faith in 
the company and its chief engineer.40
But the painting also documents loss, “the old order changing, the 
easy-going past giving way to the quick living future”.41  Turner regis-
ters the disturbance as well as the exhilaration railways could bring. 
Smog obscures the riverscape.  A pleasure boat is buffeted by the train’s 
passage.  The old road bridge is a puny echo of its rival.  This is, per-
haps, to misread the painting’s critical focus for despair.  Alternatively, 
the road bridge mocks pretensions to grandeur, while the hare racing in 
the engine’s path suggests that the latter is not moving quite so fast 
after all.  But whether Turner is meekly accepting or cocking a snook, it 
is clear that his attitude is not simply, or only, celebratory.  The very 
features that made the GWR extraordinary also give rise to anxiety.  As 
we will see, Turner was not alone in feeling this.
Unique among Victorian railway engineers, Brunel contrived to 
leave his mark on the landscapes of posterity.42  His judgement was 
questioned because it was aesthetic rather than utilitarian, oriented to 
the future not the present.  Profit “was of minor consideration” to him, 
Smiles wrote, and “public convenience” was disregarded.43  This disre-
gard seemed, to some, to manifest sinister intent, to appeal to some-
thing beyond the marketplace - profitability measured not by dividends, 
40　The best accounts of the picture are John Gage, Turner: Rain, Steam and Speed, (Lon-
don, 1972) and Stephen Daniels, ‘J.M.W. Turner and the Circulation of the State’, in Fields 
of Vision: Landscape Imagery and National Identity in England and the United States, 
(Cambridge, 1993), 112-145.  See also Andrew Wilton, J.M.W. Turner: His Art and Life, 
(New York, 1979), 193-228. 
41　J.McCoubrey, ‘Time’s Railway: Turner and the Great Western’, Turner Studies, 6 (1986), 
33-39: on 33.  Also Michel Serres, ‘Turner Translates Carnot’, Hermes. Literature, Science, 
Philosophy, ed. J.V.Harari & D.F.Bell, (Baltimore, 1982), 54-62. 
42　D.Beckett, Brunel’s Britain, (Newton Abbot, 1980). 
43　Samuel Smiles, The Story of the Life of George Stephenson, (London, 1864), 305. 
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nor even utility, but by vague gestures towards something else, couched 
as the ‘national good’.  Much of the criticism of Brunel’s work was in-
spired by concern that here there was the potential for machinery to 
become an agent of repression.  “If the public did not pay they ought to 
be made to pay.  A generation of pigmies would grow into a generation 
of giants if a good ideal standard was adopted.”44
The GWR was to become the best loved of all railway companies, 
but love of a kind many Victorians did not believe a railway should in-
spire.  It paraded its monumentality a little too ostentatiously.  Yes, 
GWR trains were quicker and its carriages more luxurious.  Opponents 
admitted that the broad gauge, if it could be got to work properly, deliv-
ered a higher standard of service.  But by the mid-1840s, as Bourne 
embarked upon his lithographs, a good case could be made for the ma-
jority of railway users suffering in consequence of Brunel’s peculiar 
technological vision.  Even before the Gauge War erupted in 1844 the 
company had come in for criticism, originating from within, and spread-
ing in ever-increasing circles of discontent.  Who exactly, people began 
to ask, did the GWR serve?
2. VESTED INTERESTS
Initially at least, it was not the public, or the nation, or mankind, 
but Bristol’s commercial elite.  A railway connection with London had 
first been mooted by a committee representing three mainstays of the 
Bristol oligarchy: the town Corporation, the Merchant Venturers’ Socie-
ty, and the Dock Company.  The “public countenance” these bodies lent 
the venture was crucial.45  The GWR was prized because, in difficult 
44　Devey, Locke, 189-90. 
45　Both bodies were well represented on the directorate; in 1835 seven directors were 
members of the Corporation and six were Merchant Venturers.  See Nokes, History of the 
GWR, 2; G.Channon, ‘The recruitment of directors to the board of the GWR’, Journal of 
Transport History, 3rd Series¸ 17 (1996), 1-19; John Latimer, Annals of Bristol in the 
19th Century, (Bristol, 1887), 189; idem, The History of the Society of Merchant Venturers 
of the City of Bristol, (Bristol, 1903), 257; P.McGrath, The Merchant Venturers of Bristol, 
(Bristol, 1975), 439.
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times, it promised “in a very extensive degree to improve the Trade and 
Commerce of the City.”46 Bristol, second only to London in commercial 
importance in the first half of the eighteenth century, was a declining 
force. It was dependent on a dwindling West Indian and Irish trade, and 
its staple industries - glass, metal working, brewing, sugar processing - 
were stagnating. In 1831 the populace had registered its displeasure 
with the Tory Corporation in the worst violence of the Reform crisis. 
Economic weakness and class hostility threatened the mercantile cul-
ture that had made the city rich.47 A minority of Whigs and liberal To-
ries responded to the city’s plight by sponsoring projects emphasising a 
commitment to civic unity and economic regeneration. This was the con-
text in which Brunel first made himself known to the Bristol elite. 
Projects such as the Clifton Bridge, the liberalisation of the docks and, 
later, the development of the first steamships, conserved without giving 
the appearance of conservatism, accommodated progress in order to stave 
off more radical reform. The GWR was likewise an instrument to restore 
civic pride and revive commerce. Measures of profitability applied to other 
railways, notably share dividends, were a secondary consideration.48
A clause in the GWR’s charter stipulated that all directors should 
46　McGrath, Merchant Venturers, 439. 
47　B.W.E.Alford, ‘The economic development of Bristol in the 19th century: an enigma?’ 
in P.McGrath & J.Cannon (eds.) Essays in Bristol and Gloucestershire History, (Bristol, 
1976), 252-283; J.F.Nicholls & J.Taylor, Bristol Past and Present, (Bristol, 1882) 324-
338 (on the riots).  For Bristol’s governance and its discontents in the period see G.Bush, 
Bristol and its Municipal Government 1820-1851, (Bristol, 1976). 
48　Unusually for Bristol, Whigs outnumbered Tories. Robert Bright, the leading subscriber, 
was the son of one of the previous century’s most active and progressive Whigs; Robert 
Bright senior had been a student of Priestley, a friend to Davy and Marc Brunel, and the 
foremost patron of William Jessop’s harbour improvement schemes of the 1790s.  Another 
director, T.R.Guppy, married social respectability with a leaning towards radicalism; he 
was Brunel’s chief ally on the directorate. George Henry Gibbs (a director of the London 
Assurance Corporation as well as the GWR), while politically more circumspect, also had a 
strong emotional investment in the broad gauge.  See McGrath, Merchant Venturers; Ni-
cholls & Taylor, Bristol Past and Present, 319-318; R.Trainor, ‘Urban Elites in Victorian 
Britain’, Urban History Yearbook, 1985, 1-17; M.C.Jacob, Scientific Culture and the Making 
of the Industrial West, (Oxford, 1997), 192-201 (on Robert Bright senior); P.Bright, Dr 
Richard Bright, (London, 1983), passim, (on Robert Bright junior). For attempts to revive 
Bristol’s dormant scientific culture in the early 19th century see Michael Neve, ‘Science in 
a commercial city: Bristol 1820-1860’ in Ian Inkster & Jack Morell (eds.) Metropolis & 
Province. Science in British Culture, 1780-1850, (London, 1983), 179-204. 
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reside in either Bristol or London.  Directors were appointed on the as-
sumption that the “best constituted Board will comprise gentlemen, all 
of high character and integrity, but of various stations, habits and pro-
fessions of life”.49  The first directorate combined interests in shipping, 
merchant banking, West Indian trade and the glass industry.  Political, 
commercial and family ties intertwined.  Two firms, the Phoenix Glass 
Works and Gibbs, Bright & Co., merchant bankers, supplied five direc-
tors between them.50  These men were willing to invest heavily in the 
company.  In 1835-1836 the mean value of their holdings was £8128. 
What they required from their railway were promises of progress, not 
dividends: they were already rich.  Their needs, the perceived needs of 
commercial travellers, and Brunel’s vision dovetailed.51  The luxurious 
carriages, the express trains speeding past the sidetracked wagons con-
taining goods and third-class passengers, the epauletted functionaries, 
were emblems of gentility.  Bourne was to contrast the rough-hewn con-
sumers of railway services in northern England to the more cultivated 
travellers of Cheltenham, Gloucester and Cirencester, “a class of pas-
sengers if not so numerous, yet indulging in higher comforts than the 
general population of such cities as Birmingham and Manchester.”  For 
the mercantile passenger time saved by taking a GWR express made 
“the difference between his dining or sleeping abroad or at home, that 
is, it frequently makes the difference between his omitting his journey 
and performing it.”52 
This very particular idea of what the GWR stood for did no go un-
challenged. Throughout 1838 and 1839 the directorate confronted share-
holder disquiet at company policy, and distrust of the broad gauge. 
49　Channon, ‘GWR directors’, 13. 
50　Ibid; John Latimer, Annals of Bristol 188; B.W.E.Alford, ‘Economic development’ 262 (on 
the Phoenix Glass Company). 
51　As noted, Guppy was an admirer of Brunel; the engineer also enjoyed close social rela-
tions with the Bright family, and was regarded (rather sorrowfully) by George Henry 
Gibbs as a good friend. For Brunel’s Bristol connections see R.A.Buchanan, ‛Brunel in 
Bristol’ in McGrath & Cannon (eds.) Bristol & Gloucs History, 217-251.  
52　Bourne, History of the GWR, 3-4, 11; Latimer, Annals of Bristol, 190-191; Booker, The 
GWR, 79. 
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John Latimer, Bristol’s foremost nineteenth-century historian, was to 
attribute the troubles to the directors “neglecting the sober-minded, 
practical, and economical engineers of the North” in favour of Brunel, 
an “inexperienced theorist” with a tendency to make free with other peo-
ple’s money.  Shareholders chafed at the demands on their pockets and 
even more at depressed share prices and low dividends.  Profits were 
being sacrificed to Brunel’s idiosyncrasies.53 Accordingly, in 1838 a group 
of Liverpool-based shareholders campaigned to oust both the chief engi-
neer and his gauge.54  At a meeting in January 1839 the dissentients 
proposed, “that the plans of construction pursued by Mr Brunel are in-
judicious, expensive and ineffectual for this professed object and ought 
not to be persevered in”.55 The struggle reflected wider social and com-
mercial antagonisms, and was the occasion of not a little West Country 
snobbery.56 The GWR directors expressed disdain for the profit motive 
and dismissed the Liverpool shareholders as uncultivated upstarts. 
Gibbs seethed at being “in the power of a set of fellows who hold a large 
number of shares and who have no other merit to recommend them.” 
Gibbs, according to a cousin, craved “for the stimulus of some great 
strokes in business”; he believed that an overriding interest in profit 
compromised the company’s loftier ends.  He abhorred the “selfish, il-
liberal and ungentlemanlike minds” of his adversaries, “which lead them 
to measure everything that is done by rule of pocket.”  The purpose of 
53　Costs rose from an initial estimate of £2,805,000 in 1833, to £4,000,000 in 1838; in 1844 
total paid up capital amounted to £8,160,000. See John Latimer, Annals of Bristol 191-192. 
54　The ‘Liverpool group’ armed themselves with the results of experiments conducted by 
Nicholas Wood, John Hawkshaw, and Dionysius Lardner, which showed the broad gauge 
to be exorbitant and inefficient.  See Dionysius Lardner, ’First Report on the Determina-
tion of the Mean Numerical Values of Railway Constants’, Proceedings of the British As-
sociation for the Advancement of Science VII (1838) 197-252, esp. the conclusions on 251-
252.  Brunel and Gooch successfully cast doubt upon the experimental protocols: the first, 
but not the last, instance of the GWR proving resistant to rival claims of reason.  See 
pp24-25, below. 
55　Nokes, History of the GWR, 37; Jack Simmons, The Birth of the Great Western Railway: 
Extracts from the Diary and Correspondence of George Henry Gibbs (Bath, 1971).
56　Bristol’s decline had benefited Liverpool, now the country’s major Atlantic port, pos-
sessing a vast industrial hinterland.  See Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities, (Harmondsworth, 
1968), 365-366. 
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the GWR had never been merely to pay.  Galvanised by appeals to com-
mercial pride, and with Charles Babbage lending scientific support to 
the broad gauge, the Bristol/London mercantile connexion defeated the 
motion, albeit narrowly.57
Brunel was “almost brokenhearted” by the slurs on his competence 
and declared himself willing to give way in favour of Joseph Locke.  His 
despair was compounded by his powerlessness.  He might have enjoyed 
close personal relations with Bright, Guppy and Gibbs, but the attacks 
of the ‘Liverpool group’ had revealed the extent to which his expertise 
was subordinate to the interests of his masters.  Gibbs’ diary records 
numerous conversations with fellow-directors in which Brunel’s resigna-
tion was mooted.  In the end, the engineer was fortunate the company 
remained prepared to bankroll his vision.  Still, it was his decisions that 
were being calumniated, his name, not that of any of the mostly anony-
mous directors, tarnished.  From this period, Brunel’s ability to shift 
from conception to operation, to build machines that worked and lasted, 
was to be repeatedly questioned.58
3. DISASTERS:
THE GWR & THE TRAVELLING PUBLIC
From the inception of the broad gauge doom-sayers had warned of 
the risk to passengers of the high speeds projected by Brunel and his 
supporters.  In fact, during the first three years of its operational life 
the GWR was one of the safest – if not most reliable - of railways.59 
Then, on the evening of 24 December 1841, disaster struck.  A slippage 
57　J.A.Gibbs, The History of Antony and Dorothea Gibbs, (London, 1922), 309-310; Sim-
mons, Birth of the GWR, 1-3, 49-51; Charles Babbage, Passages from the life of a Philoso-
pher (1864) ed. M.Campbell-Kelly, (London, 1991) 239-240. 
58　Simmons, Birth of the GWR, 51-2, 61; Channon, ‘GWR directors’, 8. For the vari-
ous delays, bankruptcies and technical problems that bedevilled the Clifton Bridge see 
J.F.Nicholls & J.Taylor, Bristol Past and Present, III.319-318.  The bridge was not opened 
until 1864, five years after Brunel’s death. 
59　L.T.C.Rolt, Red for Danger: A History of Railway Accidents and Railway Safety, 4th Ed., 
(Newton Abbot, 1982), 36. 
（ 70 ）
on the Sonning cutting, the longest on the line, deposited a mass of 
“spoil” onto the tracks.  A third-class train, directly in its path, was de-
railed.  Eight men were killed and seventeen injured, all “of the labour-
ing class.”  The machinery of state railway regulation was set in motion, 
and Frederic Smith, one of the newly created Inspectors of Railways, 
hurried to the scene to investigate.60  His conclusion was that the acci-
dent could not have been prevented.  The driver, Thomas Reynolds, “a 
steady man”, was exonerated.  So, to an extent, was the company. 
Speed was not a factor in the disaster.  But while the company was not 
liable for causing the accident, it was culpable in its effects.  The acci-
dent had been unavoidable, but it need not have been fatal.
A derailment had become a tragedy, Smith wrote, because on im-
pact nearly all of the passengers had been thrown from the train.  One 
reason was the absence of buffers; the GWR had not seen fit to install 
them.  Further, Smith reported that he was “bound to state that the 
third-class carriages used on the occasion of this accident were not of 
such construction as the public have a right to expect.”  The seats were 
eighteen inches from the floor, the sides only two feet high, so that any 
person standing up, and many of those sitting down, were “in great dan-
ger of being thrown out of the carriage”.  Besides which, even under 
normal conditions the carriage-design showed scant regard for passen-
gers: “the exposure to the cutting winds of the winter must be very in-
jurious to the traveller”.61
Sonning demonstrated the GWR’s understanding of the relationship 
between wealth, worth, and the duty of care.62  Its commitment to the 
60　Smith’s report on the Sonning disaster is in PP.1842.XLI Report of the Officers of the 
Railway Department, 77-79. The following account is drawn from this source.  For gov-
ernment procedures on the occasion of railway accidents see Rolt, Red for Danger; Henry 
Parris, Government and Railways in nineteenth-century Britain, (London, 1965), 28-47; 
Stanley Hall, Railway Detectives: The 150-year Saga of the Railway Inspectorate, (London, 
1990).  
61　PP.1842.XLI Report of the Officers of the Railway Department, 77-79. 
62　The exact legal responsibility of railway companies for the safety of passengers of any 
class was, in the early days, uncertain.  By the mid-1840s judges began to award punitive 
damages against companies in railway accident cases. See R.W.Kostal, Law and English 
Railway Capitalism 1825-1875, (Oxford, 1994), 279-313. 
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comfort of the genteel traveller was matched by neglect of people travel-
ling third-class.  The company was simply not interested in poorer pas-
sengers: in the six months to July 1841 it had the lowest volume of 
third class traffic of any railway company, regardless of size.63  It had 
nobler ends than the carting of those whom Bourne referred to as the 
“numerous” to and from their places of work.  A disavowal of responsi-
bility for an entire class of passengers had, in the Sonning cutting, led 
to carnage.
Smith’s report concluded with a recommendation to establish mini-
mum standards of third-class passenger safety, and was one of the fac-
tors leading to the 1844 legislative requirement for third-class carriages 
to be clean, moderately comfortable, and safe – the inauguration of the 
‘parliamentary carriage’.  Unrepentant, the GWR resisted this and other 
attempts by the government to regulate its provision of third-class trav-
el.  Poorer passengers continued to experience discomfort, “wholly un-
protected from the weather”; according to Latimer, the directorate, re-
luctant to implement the 1844 legislation, “revenged themselves by in-
venting a horse-box for the obnoxious caste, and by reducing the speed 
of the cheap trains to twelve miles an hour”.  All this as Gooch’s express 
engines got faster, and the first-class carriages yet more extravagantly 
fitted out.64
Four months after Sonning the world witnessed its first major rail-
way disaster.  It happened in France, not in Britain, and had no direct 
connection with the GWR.  Nonetheless, the disaster was felt to have 
major implications for British railway practice, and that of the GWR in 
particular.
The Meudon disaster of 8 May 1842 was a derailment, followed by 
a boiler explosion, leading to a fire that spread to the carriages, which 
were crammed with revellers returning home to Paris from a Versailles 
63　PP.1842.XLI Report of the Officers of the Railway Department, xii. 
64　Booker, The GWR, 79-80; C.E.Lee, Passenger Class Distinctions, (London, 1946), 15-16, 
21-23; Latimer, Annals of Bristol, 190-191. 
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fête.65   The heat at the front of the train was so intense that the pas-
sengers’ jewellery melted, and bodies fused together.66  It was difficult to 
disentangle the flesh from the machinery: estimates of the number 
killed ranged from 45 to 187.  The night of the accident witnessed a 
near-riot while relatives picked over the debris in a search for traces of 
loved ones.  “At Serves, Meudon and Bellevue, persons are to be seen in 
a state of distraction running and searching amongst the ashes to en-
deavour to discover their friends.”67  The British press recorded these 
and other details with a shuddering fascination.
Of the three causes bruited for the accident the first, excessive 
speed, was soon discounted.  The train had been moving at no more 
than 20 mph at the time of the derailment.  More decisive were defects 
in four-wheeled locomotives of the type used on the Versailles line – no-
tably, over-strained axle-rods.  That so many people had died was at-
tributed to the two-locomotive haulage system (thereafter discontinued 
in both France and Britain), the absence of buffers, and the fact that the 
carriage doors had been locked from the outside, preventing escape.68 
The specific mechanical causes of the Meudon disaster were of little 
concern to British observers, who assumed a natural superiority in Brit-
ish locomotive workmanship.  National pride was piqued at the rumour 
that the driver, a Mancunian, had been drunk, but this was refuted.69 
What worried the British were the locked doors.  “Locking-in” was com-
mon practice on many railways.  Sonning had demonstrated the effects 
of passengers being inadequately confined to their carriages.  Meudon, 
by contrast, showed that in certain circumstances the carriage was the 
least appropriate place for anybody to be.
After Meudon the GWR was the only major company in Britain to 
65　Siecle, quoted in The Times, 11 May 1842 7. 
66　‛The Paris Railway Accident - More Victims to Mismanagement’, Mechanics’ Magazine, 
36 (1842), 395-397; Illustrated London News, 1 (1842), 4.  
67　Railway Times, 5 (1842), 529-530. 
68　Ibid, 564-564; PP.1842.XLI. Copies of Communications from the Board of Trade in refer-
ence to locking both the Doors of Railway Carriages, 1. 
69　Morning Chronicle, 14 May 1842, 5.
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persist with locking-in.  Some passengers, Charles Saunders (the com-
pany’s secretary) argued, were not only a threat to themselves, they also 
endangered the lives of others.  This stance drew a stern rebuke from 
the state.  Companies were not, Samuel Laing stated, responsible for 
the actions of idiots, suicides or drunkards, but they were liable for the 
well being of the majority of passengers, those who were not foolish, 
reckless, wilful or incontinent.  He concluded: “in the case of lives being 
lost in consequence of the passengers being locked up, the blame would 
be properly attributed to the Directors.”70 
Saunders had written to Laing explaining that locking in was a pre-
caution, not a risk.  “If it were done only for the purpose of saving the 
life of a person devoid of common prudence, or reckless from liquor, and 
therefore incapable of preserving himself, the system would still seem to 
be warranted, unless it could be shown that greater danger would en-
sure therefrom to other passengers”, which Saunders of course denied.71 
Others were more forthright.  One apologist wrote to the Railway Times 
asserting that passengers should be glad to relinquish responsibility to 
the company and its employees.  The railway passenger was not a ra-
tional or responsible agent: he or she needed looking after.  George 
Beauclerc, a GWR director, pursued the point.  He argued that it was 
the “duty” of companies to lock the carriage doors, because if an accident 
did occur the passengers would be too unhinged to fend for themselves. 
He made an analogy to the cowardice of soldiers when not disciplined by 
their officers.72  In response, the company’s critics did not stint in their 
scorn.  Sydney Smith, finding a fresh hobbyhorse, described locking-in 
as a violation of a basic political right: “In all other positions of life 
there is egress where there is ingress.  Man is universally the master of 
his own body, except he chooses to go from Paddington to Bridgewater; 
there only Habeas Corpus is refused.”  The GWR treated everybody, 
regardless of age, sex, status, physical and mental health, as a lunatic, 
70　PP.1842.XLI. Communications in reference to locking the Doors of Railway Carriages, 1. 
71　Ibid, 7-10. 
72　Railway Times, 5 (1842), 559, 660-662. 
（ 74 ）
fit only for imprisonment.  Smith inveighed against “this over-officious 
care of the public; as if every man who was not a railway director was 
a child or a fool.  But why stop here?  Why are not strait-waistcoats 
used?  Why is not the accidental traveller strapped down?  Why do con-
tusion and fracture still remain physically possible?”73  Passengers were 
subjected to “abominable tyranny and perilous imprisonment”, in the 
event of accidents prevented from pursuing self-preservation, treated as 
if they lacked all reason.  A Morning Chronicle correspondent even com-
pared his train to cages at a zoo: “there we were, shut up like felons, 
stared at like wild beasts, merely to gratify the morbid, if real, and in-
sulting, if assumed, philanthropy of the directors.”74  Sam Weller, locked-
in during the course of Master Humphrey’s Clock, thereby considered 
the railway “unconstitootional and an inwaser o’privileges” - an ironic 
reversal, because these were charges often levelled against the execu-
tive.75 
Meudon intensified the debate over whether government should in-
tervene to protect the railway public from companies, with the GWR 
often being presented as the sine qua non of railway negligence.  Before 
Sonning George Stephenson had written to Henry Labouchere warning 
of the likelihood of disaster on the GWR mainline and urging the In-
spectorate to impose safety procedures upon the company: “I am quite 
sure that some interference on the part of Government is much wanted 
... I am convinced that some system should be laid down, to prevent wild 
and visionary schemes [i.e. Brunel’s], being tried, at the great danger of 
injury or loss of life to the public.”76  Now, George Cayley, author of one 
of the first studies of railway accidents, argued that after Meudon it was 
urgent for the government to oversee the installation of buffers on every 
73　Sydney Smith, ‘Locking In on Railways’ (1842) in Selected Writings of Sydney Smith ed. 
W.H.Auden, (London, 1957), 311-316: on 312. 
74　Morning Chronicle, 24 May 1842, 6. 
75　Quoted in Richard Altick, The Presence of the Present: Topics of the Day in the Victorian 
Novel, (Ohio, 1991), 188.  C.f. Joshua Toulmin Smith, Government by Commissions Illegal 
and Pernicious, (London, 1849). 
76　Quoted in Hall, Railway Detectives, 18-19.
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train in Britain.  “[I]t is ... absurd and wicked”, he wrote, “not to have 
the most rational means of preventing these accidents enforced upon the 
railway companies by law.”  John Robertson, editor of the Mechanic’s 
Magazine, agreed that passenger safety should not be entrusted to rail-
way proprietors and their lackeys, more concerned with profit than with 
preventing accidents: “we shall wonder greatly if the good sense of soci-
ety bear much longer with the apathy of railway proprietors, or the 
empty babble of their apologists.”77 
The GWR was not alone in opposing the legislative imposition of 
safety procedures, but its motives were unusual.  “I do not conceive,” 
Brunel had told a select committee in 1841, “that it is to the advantage 
of the public, in the management of the railway system, that any power 
should be given to the Board of Trade, or any central body, to issue 
regulations for the management of the concern.”78  The mistake lay in 
thinking of British railways as a network, the same in all its parts, 
which in turn should be held to a common standard.  A railway com-
pany, Brunel stated, depended upon the essentially local management of 
human and mechanical resources.  External regulation, whether execu-
tive or by agreement of private interests, was superfluous, if not down-
right detrimental.  Instead, it was “by gradual and progressive improve-
ments in all the little details, that the risk of accident is diminished; 
and it is by that alone that the risk of danger will be removed.”79  Goods 
and property damaged, people killed and injured, were not properly the 
concern of the State.  The railway accident, according to Brunel, was the 
province of middle management.
GWR tardiness in responding to Sonning and Meudon exposed the 
limitations of this approach to railway operations, limitations, it seemed, 
apparent to all but the GWR.  As public fears about accidents grew, the 
77　George Cayley, Essay on the Prevention of Railway Accidents, (London, 1842); idem, ‘On 
the Late Accident on the Paris & Versailles Railway’, Mechanics’ Magazine, 36 (1842), 397-
398; Robertson’s comments are on p396 of the same issue. 
78　PP 1841.VIII Select Committee on the Prevention of Accidents upon Railways, 43-49.
79　Ibid. Context for this kind of argument can be found in Otto Mayr, Authority, Liberty & 
Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe, (Baltimore, 1986).  
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company made little visible effort to alleviate the risk.  Third-class pas-
sengers were crammed into wagons from which precipitation was a con-
stant threat.  Those fortunate enough to travel first-class experienced 
speed and comfort, but at the cost of a loss of liberty that had, at Meu-
don, proved fatal.  Bourne’s lithographs have come down to us wreathed 
in antique glamour; to contemporaries, though, they must have ap-
peared more than a little hollow.80
4. WAR: THE COMPANY VERSUS THE STATE
Brunel’s belief that all railways were different and should be treat-
ed differently was not common currency.  It was much more common to 
hold to the opposite, that the railway network was founded on the main-
tenance of precise and uniform standards, and that deviations from 
those standards were harmful to the national interest:
Throughout the whole, the machinery is adjusted on one plan to the small-
est fraction of an inch; the parts at Bristol or at Birmingham must fit the 
parts in London with the accuracy of clockwork.  In point of time, the com-
bination must be no less complete and exact.  It is to defects in that special 
point of combination that we attribute the greater number of accidents; and 
in order to prevent these accidents, we are, with all diligence and anxiety, 
perfecting the existing system of combination, until at last every movement 
throughout the whole will be regulated by the spirit of unity.81 
The ‘defect’ was the broad gauge.  With the boom in railway con-
struction in mid-decade, the GWR sent lines south into Dorset, Devon 
and Cornwall, west into South Wales, and north towards Gloucester and 
Birmingham.  Expansion brought a problem that had seemed distant in 
80　Klingender, Art and the Industrial Revolution, 140.
81　Thornton Hunt, Unity of the Iron Network, (London, 1846), 23-24.  On the GWR as an 
affront to standards see Tim Alborn, Conceiving Companies: Joint-stock Politics in Victo-
rian England, (London, 1998), 175-180; and on technical standards more generally, M. 
Norton Wise, ‘Precision: Agent of Unity and Product of Agreement’, in Wise, ed., The Val-
ues Of Precision, (Princeton, 1995), 222-236. 
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the 1830s, when the decision had been made to adopt the broad gauge. 
What would happen when, as was now inevitable, the broad gauge net-
work met up with the narrow? 
The weak link turned out to be Gloucester: Bristol trains entered on 
the broad gauge, Birmingham trains on the narrow.  With travellers 
and traders severely inconvenienced, in the summer of 1845 – after 
some vigorous politicking from Richard Cobden on behalf of the narrow 
gauge interest – Parliament voted for a Royal Commission to investigate 
the problems that had arisen, and were likely to arise in the future, 
from breaks of gauge on the expanding railway network.82
The Commission comprised Frederic Smith, now retired from the 
Railway Inspectorate but still a senior figure in the Royal Engineers; 
George Biddell Airy, head of the Greenwich Observatory; and Peter Bar-
low, Professor of Mathematics at the Woolwich Military Academy. 
Smith was an experienced, if not universally respected, railwayman. 
Airy and Barlow’s scientific credentials were thought to be a guarantee 
of rigour.83  It is worth examining their activities in some detail, because 
these furnish an unusually vivid example of how nineteenth-century 
‘reason’ – in this case, the idea that the railway network was precisely 
that, a network, all of the component parts of which should be held to a 
common standard – could be instantiated in and through the state ap-
82　Hansard 3rd Series, LXXXI (1845), ‘Debate of the Oxford & Wolverhampton Railway Bill’, 
971-1002: on 971-972.  Cobden’s initial amendment to the Oxford & Wolverhampton Bill 
was defeated by 247 votes to 113, after Peel made a speech implying that it would be in-
jurious to the “private interests” of the GWR; Cobden then moved for the establishment of 
a Gauge Commission unattached to the specific issue of the Oxford & Wolverhampton 
Railway, and this was carried nem con.  A number of MPs, lobbied by narrow gauge com-
panies, shared Cobden’s anti-broad gauge fervour.  On 9 June G.C.Glyn, chairman of the 
London & Birmingham, had written to the Midlands and Great North England Railways 
urging them to ‘write to all Members of Parliament with whom you are connected’ and 
bring to their attention ‘the importance of this contest between the two systems’.  See the 
Royal Greenwich Observatory, ‘Gauge Commission’, Archive  RGO 6/291/3 86.
83　Alan Chapman, ‛Science and the Public Good: George Biddell Airy and the concept of a 
Scientific Civil Servant’ in Nicholas Rupke (ed) Science, Politics and the Public Good, (Lon-
don, 1988), 36-62, esp. 44.  Airy would later do government work on metropolitan sewers, 
the Ordnance Survey, the Great Exhibition, and coinage reform.  See A.J.Meadows, Green-
wich Observatory Volume II: Recent History, 1836-1975, (London, 1975), 110.   
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paratus.84  The GWR, of course, fought this idea every step of the way, 
and not without some short-term success.  But in so doing it very pub-
licly forfeited any claim to disinterest – and thus to having the interests 
of the wider travelling public at its heart. 
It was assumed that there was a solution to the gauge problem, one 
that would still the voices of faction and advance only the national in-
terest.  This hope was not realized.  Supporters of the narrow gauge 
insisted on “the great benefit of UNIFORMITY OF SYSTEM - of a NA-
TIONAL GAUGE”, which the broad gauge was undermining.  The Rail-
way Chronicle, in a histrionic editorial, demanded that the commission-
ers recognise this fact.  “Their decision, if for the public interest, will 
reflect on them personal credit and enduring gratitude”.  But if the 
Commission ruled in favour of a dual gauge network it would be over-
whelmed “with neverending disgrace.”85  Broad gauge apologists claimed 
that the narrow gauge interest wanted only to prevent the advantages 
of speed and comfort from being more widely enjoyed.  “The Broad 
Gauge and the Narrow Gauge” one wag scoffed.  “The meaning of these 
phrases depends, in a great measure, upon whether you happen to have 
shares in the Great Western or the North Western Line.  If you are a 
proprietor of the former, the narrow gauge is a paltry humbug;- if of the 
latter, the broad gauge is an extravagant quackery.”86
The Commission was diligent and aspired to even-handedness.  Cir-
culars were sent to all railway companies.  To the same end the commis-
sioners travelled widely, to Gloucester, Birmingham, Norwich, York, 
Winchester, Croydon, Paris, negotiating surly workmen, hysterical sta-
tionmasters and abusive engineers.  Transhipment machineries were 
tested.  They visited the Clearing House in Drummond Street, to see 
how far the break of gauge disrupted the through-ticket system.  They 
poured over the Times, Railway Times, Railway Record, Railway Jour-
84　On which generally see Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State 
Formation as Cultural Revolution, (Oxford, 1985).
85　Railway Chronicle, 22 November 1845, 1897-1898. 
86　A.B.Reach, The Comic Bradshaw: or, Bubbles from the Boiler, (London, 1848), 39. 
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nal, Railway Gazette, and Railway Chronicle.  They called nearly fifty 
witnesses to the committee room; the GWR complicated matters by in-
sisting that a broad gauge representative sit in on all interviews.  Be-
tween July and February Airy devoted over ninety days to Commission 
duties, losing priority over the discovery of Neptune in the process.87 
Majority opinion favoured the narrow gauge.  This was itself prob-
lematic.  Cobden objected to the break of gauge because it restricted 
freedom of trade and nurtured local monopolies.  But from another per-
spective the gauge war was perfect railway competition.  Passengers 
benefited from larger carriages, higher speeds and greater reliability; 
shareholders and speculators from generous dividends; contractors and 
engineers from the sheer volume of business.  A decision for the narrow 
gauge would create a monopoly in place of profitable rivalry.  The broad 
gauge was, after all, the only real alternative to the standard railway 
machineries developed by the Stephensons.  Lord Hatherton, the voice 
of the GWR in the Lords, spoke in this regard of “the necessity of main-
taining the principle of competing lines between all the great towns in 
the kingdom.”88  Worse, enforced uniformity of gauge would do the GWR 
a clear injustice.  The company had acted in good faith.  Why should it 
now suffer at the hands of Parliament?  If, as opponents demanded, it 
were forced to convert to the narrow gauge, how could it be compensated?89 
What the commissioners needed were objective facts on the relative 
merits of the two systems.  If the broad gauge were indeed faster and 
smoother, without a sacrifice of efficiency, it would be wrong to legislate 
it out of existence.  Alternatively, the less accurate the GWR’s puffery, 
the less justifiable its singularity. Accordingly, the Commission arranged 
87　RGO 6/284; 6/291; 6/309 3,4,12.  For Airy and Neptune see Alan Chapman, ‘Private 
Research and Public Duty: George Biddell Airy and the search for Neptune’, Journal of the 
History of Astronomy, 19 (1988), 121-139.  
88　Hansard 3rd Series, LXXXIV (1846).  From this point of view the GWR was supported by 
Bradshaw’s Gazette, for which uniformity of gauge portended a state monopoly, the spectre 
that had haunted this journal since before the 1844 Railway Act.  See Bradshaw’s Railway 
Gazette, 28 February 1846, 464-465. 
89　PP.1846.XVI Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Merits of the 
Broad and Narrow Gauge. 
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two sets of experiments for December 1845, to be conducted by the in-
terested parties but subject to strict protocols.  First, broad gauge en-
gines were tested for speed, oscillation, and the power/weight ratio on 
the fifty-three mile stretch between Paddington and Didcot.  Two weeks 
later the experiments were repeated with narrow gauge engines on the 
forty-five mile stretch connecting York and Darlington.  One commis-
sioner and a representative of the rival system had to be present 
throughout.90
The broad gauge was quicker, but its high speeds were accompanied 
by violent oscillations.  “It is questionable”, the commissioners wrote, 
“whether this contest for speed ought to be carried to any greater 
length.”  Regarding efficiency the results marginally favoured the nar-
row gauge.  The commissioners were cautious, holding only that broad 
gauge working costs were higher, and that “there is no economy in the 
locomotive expenses resulting from working a line on the broad gauge 
system.”  Although ceding no absolute advantage to either gauge, the 
experiments did prove that claims for the superiority of the broad were 
unfounded.91
Predictably, the GWR rejected these conclusions.  The narrow gauge 
interest had insisted that the experiments be conducted on short, flat 
stretches of line.  Saunders wrote to the commissioners pointing out 
that this nullified the broad gauge’s advantages in power and speed.  He 
also claimed that GWR witnesses had not been granted access to the 
narrow gauge engines, as they had been promised.  On both counts he 
was ignored.  Later the company hinted that its own experiments had 
been sabotaged by “some Narrow Gauge fanatic”, and that results fa-
vourable to the broad gauge were glossed over in the commissioners’ 
report.92  It also resorted to ad hominem attacks on the commissioners, 
casting aspersions on their competence and disinterest. 93  Claims to ob-
90　Nokes, History of the GWR, 134-141. 
91　PP.1846.XVI Report on the Broad and Narrow Gauge, 12-19. 
92　RGO 6/292 151-154; Nokes, History of the GWR, 136-141. 
93　[I.K.Brunel, Daniel Gooch & Charles Saunders], Observations on the Report of the Gauge 
Commissioners, (Bristol, 1846); Gooch, Memoirs and Diary, 49-51.  These attacks drew a↗
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jectivity – whether deriving from the commissioners’ executive status, or 
from experiment – could not be countenanced by the beleaguered com-
pany.94
The commissioners’ report, published in February 1846, stated un-
equivocally the necessity of uniformity of gauge.  Airy and Barlow wor-
ried about the fairness of requiring the GWR to convert; Smith was ada-
mant that, in the long run, it would have to convert.95  The local advan-
tages the broad gauge offered were outweighed by the disadvantage of 
the break at Gloucester.  None of the proposed transhipment mecha-
nisms were likely to be effective.  The GWR system was too exclusive: 
“esteeming the importance of the highest speed on express trains for the 
accommodation of a comparative small number of persons ... as of far 
less moment than affording increased convenience to the general com-
mercial traffic of the country, we are inclined to consider the narrow 
gauge as that which should be preferred for general convenience”.  The 
commissioners concluded by advising Parliament to legislate for all fu-
ture lines to be built on the narrow gauge.  The question of what should 
happen to existing broad gauge lines was unresolved.96
This modest attempt at a solution was emasculated by a Board of 
Trade committee sympathetic to the GWR’s objections.  The commission-
ers had paid too much heed to the situation at Gloucester and not 
enough to the superiorities of the wider gauge.  In addition, they had 
failed to consider that “the advance of science and the course of experi-
ence may point out a practicable method of altering an existing gauge, 
↘ memorable riposte from Lord Clarendon, who said that, railwaymen having failed to agree 
on anything, the executive would have to do the agreeing for them: “There was not a single 
engineer who had not been examined before some Commission or Committee, and there 
were scarcely two of them who agreed in opinion respecting the gauges” (Hansard 3rd Se-
ries, LXXXVIII (1846), 107.  
94　On the historical interpretation of experiment see the essays collected in D.Gooding, T.
Pinch & S.Schaffer, The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences, (Cambridge, 
1989); and on the problematic of technology and experiment, Harry Collins & Trevor 
Pinch, The Golem at Large: What You Should Know about Technology, (Cambridge, 1998).
95　See the drafts of the individual commissioners’ recommendations, RGO 6/284/7 and 
6/284/8. 
96　PP.1846.XVI. Report on the Broad and Narrow Gauge, 19.  
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and of easily effecting a great operation which is now generally consid-
ered to be so costly and so difficult as, in truth, to be impracticable.” 
Just because, for example, the transhipment problem was currently in-
surmountable did not mean that it would remain so.  The Lords, acting 
on the Board of Trade’s advice, amended the Gauge Act to enable all 
lines connecting to the GWR to be built on the broad gauge, a concession 
that left things much as they had been in 1845.97 
The Commission’s proposals may have been diluted, but they did 
mark a new stage in the conflict.  The broad gauge interest was forced 
onto the defensive.  For all that the amended Gauge Act, passed on 12 
August 1846, did little to harm the broad gauge, opinion was perceived 
to be shifting against it.  “[T]he public is against us,” wrote one GWR 
shareholder.  The broad gauge had failed to benefit its proprietors - 
dividends were still low - and it was not going to benefit anybody else. 
“It is the belief ... of not a few of us that we made a great mistake for 
our own interests in humouring our engineer with his eccentric hobby. 
In making this sacrifice we have likewise failed to secure any compen-
sating public good.”98  A three-page spread in the 6 June issue of the 
Illustrated London News famously captured the disillusionment.  The 
article set out to make readers who had never set foot in Gloucester 
sensible of the impact on ordinary human lives of this question of “par-
allel lines, essentially stiff, mechanical and monotonous”, of the suffer-
ings the GWR had inflicted.  The pictures showed cases smashed by in-
attentive porters, terrified horses manhandled between broad and nar-
row gauge wagons, women and children bewildered, in tears tyrannized 
by dark-visaged officials in GWR livery.  “Gentle Reader,” the newspaper 
counselled, “you now have a theory of what Break of Gauge is.  If you 
chance to travel yourself between Birmingham or Cheltenham and Bris-
tol, you will sensibly feel it.”  And, if the GWR had its way, if it were 
97　PP.1846.XXXVII. Minute of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade relative to Gauge 
of Railways, 2-5; MacDermot, History of the GWR, I.124. 
98　MacDermot, History of the GWR, I.101; [Anon], To the Proprietors of the Great Western 
Railway, (privately distributed among GWR shareholders, 1846), 1.  
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successful in its projections, these scenes would be repeated throughout 
the country.99
The narrow gaugers had earlier made much of the defection of Wyn-
dham Harding, former general manager of the Birmingham & Glouces-
ter Railway, who at a meeting of Birmingham businessmen in 1845 had 
admitted the break of gauge to be “a serious evil”.  Now, with the gov-
ernment unable to decide either way, their efforts intensified.  Henry 
Cole’s considerable reputation as a public servant was put to work on 
behalf of the London & North Western Railway, the largest of the nar-
row gauge companies.  In May, at Cole’s behest, Thackeray contributed 
a couple of gentle but telling satires on “that nashnal newsance - THE 
BREAK OF GAUGE” to Punch.  Samuel Sidney devoted a four hundred 
and fifty page book to the subject, including a complete transcript of the 
evidence given before the Commission.  By his reckoning, only three of 
the forty-seven witnesses called had supported the wider gauge.  GWR 
responses came to seem thin and ineffectual.  However quick broad 
gauge trains, however comfortable the first class carriages, these could 
not make up for the confusions so starkly displayed at Gloucester.  As 
Harding put it, “punctuality ... is even more desirable than speed of 
conveyance.”  The broad gauge campaign came to be focused on the hap-
less figure of Henry Lushington, late of Trinity College, Cambridge, 
whose effusions were the subject of much derision amongst the hard-
nosed hacks of the railway press.100
Speed and opulence without “punctuality and economy” were of lit-
tle use to the ordinary passenger.  “In going to the races nothing can 
equal the Great Western”, Sidney sneered: even if “it must be confessed 
that there was something imposing and grand about [Brunel’s] scheme 
99　Illustrated London News, 6 June 1846, 368-370; [Anon], A Railway Traveller’s Reasons 
for Adopting Uniformity of Gauge, (London, 1846). 
100　Wyndham Harding, Evils of a Diversity of Gauge and a Remedy, (London, 1845), 21; 
[Henry  Cole], Railway Eccentrics: Inconsistencies of Men of Genius, (London, 1846); idem, 
Fifty Years of Public Work, 2 Vols., (London, 1884), I.77-83; W.M.Thackeray, ‘Jeames on 
the Gauge Question, Punch, 10 (1846), Nos.253, 257; Sidney, Gauge Evidence; H.Lushington, 
The Broad and the Narrow Gauge; or, Remarks on the Report of The Gauge Commission-
ers, (Westminster, 1846). 
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well calculated to fascinate aspiring spirits”, all the broad gauge amount-
ed to was monumental ambition, a project that paid insufficient regard 
to the requirements of the present.  It was a victim of its celebrated 
singularity:  “The magnificent exclusiveness of the broad gauge is bro-
ken up for ever.  It mustn’t and it can’t live in isolation; the country 
won’t consent to the existence of a West End in railways.”101 
Elements of Colin Garratt’s nostalgia are now in clearer focus: the 
bucolic monumentality; the ambiguous rhetoric of interest; the tension 
between phrases like “properly co-ordinated” and “logic”, and the insist-
ence upon personal communion with the objects of nostalgic desire.  Cor-
ollaries to the forms of that desire can be found in the strategies adopt-
ed by the GWR first to assert its singularity, and then to shore it up 
against rival interests, state prerogatives, alternative visions of the rail-
way future.  It is, I would argue, no accident that the GWR holds a 
special place in the nostalgic’s affections.  But what cannot be gleaned 
from the company’s early history – except, in embryo, in Bourne’s litho-
graphs – is the origin of Garratt’s “rosy glow”.  The mixture of meretri-
cious hauteur and commercial squalor, shown most starkly in the com-
pany’s reaction to Sonning, would not on the face of it appear to be a 
propitious ground for fondness.  But fondness – love – is the desidera-
tum.  For this it will be necessary to follow Garratt into the true ‘Golden 
Age’ – the interwar period that also, not coincidentally, witnessed a re-
nascence in the GWR’s fortunes.  
5. WHERE THEY WERE HEADED
In the end, the ineffectuality of the state apparatus with regard to 
railway matters, and the residual strength of the regional model of rail-
way development, postponed the process of gauge conversion until the 
mid-1860s .102  By 1876 all GWR territory north and east of the Severn 
Bridge had been converted, with the exception of the Paddington-Bristol 
101　Sidney, Gauge Evidence, xix, xxxvii; Fraser’s Magazine, 33, (1846), 748.
102　Alborn, Conceiving Companies, passim.
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line, which continued to carry broad gauge expresses.  The last of these 
ran on 20 May 1892, the date usually taken to commemorate the end of 
the broad gauge in Britain (although a few branch services remained).103 
Gauge conversion was expensive and compounded a waning in the 
GWR following the 1866 banking crash, from which it took the company 
over twenty-five years to recover.  It had grown too big for its own good, 
and passenger services in particular suffered.  Third class passengers 
were still barred from the faster trains, and even in the comforts it pro-
vided to the higher class of traveller the GWR fell behind its competi-
tors.  The company came to exemplify a kind of organizational sclerosis. 
It had become, Edward Foxwell wrote in 1889, “stolid”, operating “with 
the immovability of Jove”.104
Recovery came in the late 1890s, in a conscious effort to recapture 
the singularity of old.  Tracks were re-laid, more powerful engines com-
missioned, dining cars introduced, at first only in first class but soon 
open to all, carriages equipped with lavatories and heaters.  Speed and 
comfort were once more GWR priorities, a fact it advertised with self-
conscious reference to what could now, from a safe distance, be repre-
sented as the company’s glory days:
On the excellencies of the Great Western in the matter of speed and smooth-
ness of travelling it is almost needless to dwell.  The trains of the Great 
Western Railway are noted for comfort, just as its road-beds have been fa-
mous for smooth-running since the days of the great G.W.R. engineer, 
Brunel.  The latest-model G.W.R. passenger coaches are the best that mod-
ern science and expert workmanship can produce.  In completeness of detail, 
artistic taste, appointments and finish the principal G.W.R. corridor express-
es vie with any trains in the world.  Large and comfortable smoking rooms 
are provided ... and the Restaurant Cars on these fast trains are some of the 
finest railway carriages running.... Some of the Great Western Expresses are 
famous as the fastest and most luxurious in the world, and represent un-
103　MacDermot, History of the Great Western Railway, 1863-1921, rev. ed. C.R.Clinker, 
(London, 1964), 1-38; Rolt, Brunel, 347-348. 
104　MacDermot, History of the GWR, II.208. 
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doubtedly the last word in modern travel-comfort.105 
By 1906, when this was written, the GWR could again present itself 
as “the best”, “the finest”, “the fastest and most luxurious”, now not just 
in Britain but the world.  But while the grandiloquence was familiar, 
this was a new form of puffery, with new targets, people travelling nei-
ther for business nor at a gentleman’s leisure, but on that compromise 
between the two, a summer holiday.  The company now styling itself 
“the Holiday Line par excellence of the British Empire” was increasingly 
dependent on the custom of middle class urban dwellers eager to escape 
the stresses of work and the squalor of the city.  Luxuries were no long-
er provided because passengers expected them as a matter of course, 
but because for most they were not an everyday occurrence.  “Day by 
day it is more and more apparent that some period of rest and relaxa-
tion ... is rapidly becoming one of the essentials of our exciting twentieth 
century existence”, holiday-makers were advised.  “What was once a 
question of caprice and luxury is now a necessity if the danger of a 
breakdown is to be avoided.”  In recognition of the importance of relaxa-
tion travellers were assured that they could relinquish all responsibility 
for their holiday to the GWR, which would arrange everything from ho-
tel bookings to day-trips to campsites.  The company even guaranteed 
local hospitality, eliding the fact that especially after the War rural in-
terests regarded the thickening tourist stream with much disquiet. 
“Landowners and farmers are invariably ready to help in every way to 
make campers comfortable” the company breezily asserted, adding: 
“when possible an inspection of the ground beforehand is advisable.”106
Despite the change in constituency, traces of the old gentility re-
mained, notably in the importance attached to the transatlantic steamer 
105　Holiday Haunts in England and Wales: A Guide to the Holiday Resorts served by the 
GWR, (London, 1911), (Ist ed. 1906), 13. 
106　Holiday Haunts, 11; Camping Holidays, (London, 1927), 3; The Ideal Holiday Lands of 
the GWR, (London, 1927) (“Present-day railway facilities make it easy for the people of the 
North and Midlands to visit these lovely parts of the country”).
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trade; Fishguard gained a main line, a terminus and a Gothic hotel be-
tween 1899 and 1906, and after the War Plymouth was the focus of 
similar attentions.107  Closer to home, haute-cuisine dining cars, baths 
and a hair-dressing saloon on Paddington’s No.1 platform, and the chris-
tening of the Plymouth holiday train ‘The Cornish Riviera Express’ im-
bued the company, and by association its customers, with at least the 
semblance of glamour.  Authentic or not, the GWR’s combination of 
preening and mass marketing was as successful as it was shameless; in 
1924 Felix Pole, the source of many of these developments, announced 
an 8% dividend.108
The GWR presented its jazz-age comforts as a complement to the 
pleasures of the past.  The Riviera Express was not only “the Holiday 
line par excellence”, but also “The Line to Legend Land”.  The historical 
“associations” of South-West England, ‘The Land of the Mayflower’, 
home to such disparate deceased luminaries as Walter Raleigh, the Pil-
grim Fathers, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, were strenuously puffed 
from GWR bookstalls.  The company counted itself among the attrac-
tions, with Brunel accorded the same kind of mythical treatment as 
Tintagel.109  It invited customers to indulge in the rueful pleasure of 
mourning the passage of time, hitching potentially critical reflection to 
commerce; the pasts evoked were not intended to be interrogated, sim-
ply consumed.  The story of the broad gauge was rewritten as a ro-
mance, a period of childish infatuation which the mature company could 
now afford to recall with indulgence, or as the occasion of a trifling disa-
greement between two good friends, Brunel and Robert Stephenson. 
Under the new dispensation, the exclusivity of the GWR’s original com-
mitment to speed and comfort, at odds with its present mass demo-
107　MacDermot, History of the GWR, II.18-228; O.S.Nock, History of the Great Western Rail-
way, 1923-1947, (London, 1967), 18-23. 
108　Holiday Haunts; Nock, History of the GWR, 13. 
109　Devon: The Lovely Land of the ‛Mayflower’,  6th Ed., (London, 1924); Legend Land, Being 
a Collection of some of the Old Tales in those Western Parts of Britain served by the Great 
Western Railway, 4 Vols., (London, 1922-1923); Brunel and After: The Romance of the 
Great Western Railway, (London, 1924). 
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graphic, underwent a subtle reconfiguration.  The mass-holiday itself 
was designed to occupy, in memories triggered by advertising promising 
so much for so little, a golden age: “There is so much health and happi-
ness to be gained by a camping holiday, for such an infinitesimal outlay, 
that those who have once experienced its joys rarely fail to fall under its 
bohemian spell.”  Of course, puffery opened up a gap between life and 
ideality, but this was largely the point.  The desire to take a “good old-
fashioned” holiday was more important than the holiday itself, because 
after all it was desire that sustained workers through the other fifty 
dreary weeks of the year, desire that would lay identical plans for next 
summer.110  Like other railway companies, but more successfully, the 
GWR turned nostalgia to profit by realizing that the yearning for some-
thing and sometime better must be provoked, but never consummated. 
The railway, Charles Madge and Tom Harrisson wrote in 1937, specifi-
cally citing GWR advertising, “has given us a different conception of 
space, of speed and of power.  It has rendered possible mass activities 
- the Cup Final, the monster rally, the seaside holiday, the hiking excur-
sion - whose ramifying effects on our behaviour extend almost beyond 
imagination.”111 
One of the most popular GWR enticements was W.G.Chapman’s A 
Railway Book for Boys of all Ages, first published in 1923 and running 
through six editions by the end of the decade.  Guiding readers through 
the various operations of the 10.30 a.m. Plymouth Express, this turned 
the carriage into a classroom, albeit one with “no horrible equations to 
worry you, and the GWR into an friendly master, firm where it needed 
to be but happy to indulge the appetites of youth, whether for techno-
logical fantasy or strawberries with clotted cream, a comforting presence 
110　Camping Holidays, 2; Holiday Haunts, 11. 
111　Charles Madge & Tom Harrisson, Mass-Observation, (London, 1937), 15-16.  For this 
movement see Angus Calder, ‘Mass-Observation 1937-1949’ in M.Bulmer (ed.), Essays on 
the History of British Sociological Research, (Cambridge, 1985), 121-136.  See also the com-
ments on the GWR in Arthur Elton, British Railways, (London, 1945), 26-29: perhaps the 
earliest explicit formulation, with reference to railways, of the link between monumental-
ity and the nostalgic imagination.
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on the journey into knowledge and adulthood.112  The lessons were fa-
miliar ones.  Machines are fetishized, to stress the mystery of their 
working and the power of the men who work them; the locomotive “sug-
gests the embodiment of concentrated power, and appears to be strain-
ing at the leash and anxious to stretch herself to full capacity.  Driver 
and fireman ... are obviously proud of their charge.”  Expository chap-
ters on engines, signals and safety interrupt the narrative, promising 
the pupil that under the GWR’s aegis he too might achieve railway mas-
tery.  Speed, the ultimate expression of such mastery, can once more be 
celebrated.  Thanks to Brunel, Gooch and the other GWR pioneers the 
permanent way is “generally admitted to be one of the finest in the 
world ... there is an almost entire lack of vibration”; the Paddington-
Swindon express service is “the fastest booked start-to-stop run in the 
British Isles”, with a top speed of 102 mph.  The GWR is “The line that 
put the ees in speed”; on the record-breaking Swindon run “the travel-
ling was so curiously smooth that, but for the sound, it was difficult to 
believe we were moving at all”.113 
GWR machineries are almost literally good enough to eat.  Early in 
the trip Chapman points to “the beauty of the 70-footer coaches, re-
splendent in their chocolate and cream ... colours with sweet associa-
tions for schoolboys”; later the road’s smoothness is demonstrated by the 
stability of a bottle of ginger beer on a dining car table.  The boy is on 
holiday; equally, it is important for him to understand the connection 
between railways and the production of the goods it is his pleasure to 
consume.  Just past Southall, Scott’s Emulsion Laboratory and the 
Gramophone Company Works have “direct access to Britain’s premier 
railway”, and other concerns are invited to “Settle on the Great West-
ern”.  Freight traffic is scarcely romantic, and must wait until more ex-
citing topics have been exhausted, but it is in the “conveyance of com-
modities” that the real, manly work of the GWR is done: “all means 
112　W.G.Chapman, ‘The 10.30 Limited’: A Railway Book for Boys of all Ages, 3rd Ed., (Lon-
don, 1923), i, 21. 
113　Ibid, 2-3, 65-67, 106-109.
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money in the traders’ pockets, as less capital is locked up in stock, and 
less storage accommodation has to be provided than was formerly the 
case.”114
Self-promotion is a constant strain.  The GWR is “Britain’s premier 
railway”, “has always been noted for its wonderful train speeds”, “is the 
only railway which under the grouping115 maintains its name”; the per-
manent way is “one of the finest in the world” and the Severn Tunnel is 
“the largest underwater railway tunnel in the world”; Paddington is a 
panorama of “Hustle without confusion” and passengers are subjected to 
the “old-time courtesy of G.W.R. employees.”  The book ends by admon-
ishing readers who have, despite all Chapman’s efforts, not been im-
pressed enough: “From the knowledge you have gained ... you will, I 
think, be able to realise what a wonderful thing a modern railway is, 
and particularly (note this please) what a wonderful railway the Great 
Western is”.116  The problem, as the author understood, was that awe 
could no longer be counted upon as a response to travelling by rail; the 
lures of “aeronautics, wireless, telephony, and other wonders of this 
twentieth century” were as strong, if not stronger.  There is consequent-
ly something almost frantic about his repeated assertion of GWR singu-
larity, as if the end was already in sight.  1924 would be the first year 
in which competition from the automobile significantly affected railway 
profits.117  In that “note this please” lay eighty years of embattled and 
vainglorious history; and also, finally, the first sounding of defeat.
One irony of the GWR’s history is that, initially so exclusive, it 
would be remembered more fondly, and by a larger number of people, 
than any other British railway.  This irony rests on another, more com-
plex one.  As early as the 1860s the broad gauge was a source of embar-
rassment, a mark of failure in a culture driven by dividends.  Yet 
Brunel’s achievement was never forgotten.  In the early years of the 
114　Ibid, 8, 72-73, 113-115.
115　Grouping rationalized all U.K. railways into four companies, of which the GWR was 
one.  It came into effect on 1 January 1923.  
116　Chapman, ‘The 10.30 Limited’, 106, 116, 121. 
117　Nock, History of the GWR, 20. 
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twentieth century the GWR discovered, belatedly, that speed was still 
marketable.  So was the company’s own history.  The enduring image of 
the GWR thus emerges in a dialectic between the so-called ‘Golden Age 
of Railways’ and the company’s heroic broad gauge past.  Unsurpris-
ingly, a great deal was lost in the process.  The GWR’s new constituency 
was unlikely to be much interested in tales of battling interests and 
commercial squalor: they got too much of that at home.118  Holidaymak-
ers wanted, or were perceived to want, heroes, romance, comfort, conti-
nuity.  In a nice twist, it now paid the GWR to deny that things had 
ever been, or ever would be, other than as they always already were.
“Do railway nostalgics eternally wish they were small boys?”  The 
answer is: Yes, they do.  They are forever seeking to emerge into a con-
dition that has always already been achieved, and always already lost. 
I will conclude with speculations on three forms of this peculiar dream-
state with resonances in the history of the GWR.
The first is that the conviction of absolute difference involves the 
nostalgic in a principled refusal of any argument that matters are con-
tingently other than how the nostalgic represents them as being.  Thus, 
the GWR’s peremptory dismissal of the findings of the Gauge Commis-
sion can be mapped directly onto John Tyme’s position that public in-
quiries are invalidated by dint of being inquiries: and both find expres-
sion in Garratt’s “which tails can wag the dog”.  Nostalgic romance-
narratives must not engage with any more ‘rationalist’ modes of proce-
dure.
Second, assertions of singularity are generally accompanied by at-
tempts to impose that singularity upon others.  Thus can be understood 
the GWR’s conception of its duty of care, and the mysterious ease with 
which Garratt can move from “solace” to statements of public policy. 
And, insofar as railway nostalgia is restorative nostalgia, it will always 
contain some or other principle of exclusion.  This is what we see in the 
118　On issues relating to the de-politicization of leisure see G.Stedman Jones, ‘Class Ex-
pression versys Social Control?  A critique of recent trends in the social history of leisure’, 
in Languages of Class, (Cambridge, 1983), 76-89.
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odd investments in warmth and alienation in Bourne’s lithographs, in 
Rain, Steam, and Speed, and in Garratt’s appropriation of the pictures 
of Arthur Mace.  Garratt draws inspiration from the photographs.  But 
for one uninfected by the nostalgia bug there is something slightly 
dreadful about them, opening out as they do onto a world impervious to 
doubt and, to all appearances, emptied of humanity.
Whose fault is that?  How much sympathy does the professional 
historian owe the nostalgic?  More, it might be thought, than has been 
on offer in this essay.  I have to admit to a certain impatience, and a 
certain unease, with Garratt’s style of railway nostalgia.  The impa-
tience and unease both stem, I think, from how clichéd it is, with its 
artless juggling of the archaic (“how vested interests can prevail”) and 
the colloquial (“which tails can wag the dog”).  Where does this language 
of the dream-state come from?  From advertising hoardings and holiday 
brochures, from “Brunel for ever!  Hurrah!” and “The line that put the 
ees in speed.”  The eternal boyishness of Garratt’s prose recalls for me 
Orwell’s warning that it is when we are at our most naïve, our most 
unguarded, that our dreaming selves become naked to the understand-
ings of commerce.119  At the risk of sententiousness, I would venture 
that, above all, it is to resist this that railway nostalgia must also be 
resisted.
119　George Orwell, ‘Boy’s Weeklies’ (1940), in Essays, (Harmondsworth, 1984), 78-100.
